



On Thursday 8 April 2021, the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment
in Vav#i#ka and others v. the Czech Republic. The Grand Chamber ruled strongly
(16:1) in favour of the Czech government, granting the state a wide margin of
appreciation in the assessment of the need for compulsory vaccination of children.
In light of the COVID-related challenges and the ongoing discussions about COVID
passports and the possible limitations on the freedom of unvaccinated individuals, it is
important that the Court took a clear stance regarding the importance of vaccination.
At the same time, however, it is regrettable that the Court did not offer a stronger and
more coherent reasoning justifying its value-driven decision.
Although the applicants relied on a number of Convention articles, the Court only
engaged in a thorough substantive analysis under Article 8 (and solely in its private
life dimension; 262), with only a very brief argumentation under Article 9 (freedom of
thought, conscience and religion; 337), and with a succinct statement ‘that there is no
need to examine [the] applications separately under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1’ (right
to education; 345). The Court thus did not take the opportunity to clarify whether that
provision applies also to pre-school education. (Judge Lemmens has put forward a
  persuasive criticism of the Court in this matter in his apposite separate opinion.)
The Court’s reasoning
The case originated in six applications brought against the Czech Republic between
2013 and 2015. The applicants challenged the vaccination duty imposed on all children
residing on the Czech territory. The applicants had not been vaccinated but they
complained of the consequences following from their non-compliance with the duty to
be vaccinated: a fine of up to about 400 EUR imposed on the parents, and the exclusion
of the unvaccinated children from pre-school education.
As to the context in which the judgment was delivered, there clearly is no European
consensus as to whether vaccination of children should be compulsory (278). Some
countries’ policies are based on mere recommendations while other states, including
the Czech Republic, are much more prescriptive. What all countries have in common
is that they ‘aim to achieve the highest possible level of vaccination among its
population’ (277, 285).
Most of the Court’s reasoning was given in the context of the right to private life,
under Article 8. Although none of the applicants had undergone vaccination, the Court
was surprisingly unhesitating to find that there had been an interference with the
applicants’ private lives (263; see also the government’s arguments to the contrary in
194). According to the Court, the interference consisted in the consequences of the
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applicants’ refusal to undergo vaccination which were intrinsically connected to the
vaccination duty (263).
In determining whether the interference could be justified, the Court acknowledged
that the law (266-271) pursued legitimate aims of protecting health and protecting the
rights of others (272). The Court concluded that in matters of public health where no
European consensus exists, the margin should be a wide one (276-280). The Court
agreed with the government that there was a pressing social need to protect both
individual and public health against the diseases in question (281-284) and to protect
the best interest of children by maintaining herd immunity against certain diseases
(285-289), concluding that the vaccination duty imposed by the Czech Republic was
proportionate (290-309).
In the proportionality assessment, the Court reiterated that some exceptions from
the vaccination duty were permissible, both in cases of a medical contraindication to
vaccination (291) and in cases of a secular conscientious objection (292) developed in
the Czech Constitutional Court’s case law. Neither of the two exceptions, however, was
applicable to the applicants’ situation. The Court approved of the existing procedural
safeguards in the Czech legal order (295) and asserted the integrity of the policy-
making process at the national level (297) as well as the effectiveness and safety of
the vaccines (299). Although the applicants had not incurred any damage, the Court
welcomed the availability of compensation in case of injury caused by compulsory
vaccination in general (302).
As to the non-admission of children to pre-school education, the Court stated that
this consequence was protective rather than punitive (294) and concluded that ‘the
loss of an important opportunity for these young children to develop their personalities
and to begin to acquire important social and learning skills in a formative pedagogical
environment’ was a ‘direct consequence of the choice made by their respective
parents’ (306). Given that the applicants were only restricted from pre-school education
but not deprived of the possibility to enrol in primary school, the Court concluded that
the examined measures were proportionate (309) and found no violation of Article 8
(311).
With regard to Article 9, the Court found that the applicants’ critical opinion on
vaccination was ‘not such as to constitute a conviction or belief of sufficient cogency,
seriousness, cohesion and importance to attract the guarantees of Article 9’ and
concluded that the complaints were incompatible ratione materiae and had to be
rejected (337). Finally, the Court decided not to examine the potential interference with
the children’s right to education without any explanation to that matter (345).
A brief analysis of the judgment
Having followed the applicants’ case for a considerable period of time, I was not
surprised by the Court’s decision. The Court seized the opportunity to send a very
clear signal ‘that vaccination is one of the most successful and cost-effective health
interventions’ (277) and to emphasise the value of social solidarity with those who
cannot be vaccinated. In this regard, the ongoing COVID-crisis was clearly an elephant
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in the room. Still, I expected a much higher quality of legal argumentation from the
Court; I will now address five main weaknesses of the Court’s reasoning.
A misleading perspective: not a clash of private life vs. public health
The Vav#i#ka case was framed primarily in terms of a conflict between the private life
of unvaccinated children versus the values of public health and social solidarity. That,
however, is a misleading perspective. Is private life and bodily integrity truly at stake in
cases where adults make decisions on behalf of their children while the children bear
the consequences of those decisions, without even having a chance to decide about
their own future? I strongly doubt that. Rather than a dichotomy of self-determination
versus public health, the value conflict at stake relates to the tension between the
parents’ right to make decisions on behalf of their children and the state’s right to
impose duties by which it aims to protect public health as well as the best interest of
the child at stake.
An adult person who refuses a vaccine against COVID-19 does so willingly and
voluntarily, aware of the consequences. Such a decision represents an example of
a person’s self-determination. However, a child cannot make that choice; that value
judgment is made by the parents, yet, the consequences will be borne by the child.
That tension, however, remained unaddressed by the Court’s judgment.
No forced vaccination, no interference with bodily integrity
The notion in the centre of the Court’s attention was the margin of appreciation. Should
it be very wide, given that the case concerns public health policy (274, 280), or very
narrow, since the bodily integrity of vulnerable persons is at stake? (See also the
dissenting opinion of Judge Wojtyczek, 7-8.) I am convinced that if the case originated
in a story of a forced vaccination, the applicant’s bodily integrity would be accentuated
and the state’s margin would be extremely narrow. Such a case could even be argued
under Article 3 where the idea of a margin tends to fade away from the Court’s
reasoning.
However, the applicants in the Vav#i#ka case had not been vaccinated against their
will. Although the Court initially accepted that there had been an interference with their
right to private life (263), some doubts about the intensity of that interference arose
in the Court’s reasoning on the merits. In 276, the Court first referred to an effective
enjoyment of intimate rights but then reiterated that ‘the weight of this consideration
is lessened by the fact that no vaccinations were administered against the will of the
applicants, nor could they have been, as the relevant domestic law does not permit
compliance with the duty to be forcibly imposed’ (see also 303). The fact that the
state had not even attempted to enforce the vaccination duty (293) seems to be of
high importance; one could even doubt whether the applicants suffered any tangible
interference with their rights guaranteed in Article 8.
Personally, I saw a much stronger potential in the applicants’ right to education or the
parents’ right to decide on behalf of their children, rather than in the children’s claim
under private life and bodily integrity. Having framed the case as one of interference
with the children’s private lives, the case came dangerously close to abstract judicial
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review of a national legislative measure, furthermore in a very sensitive policy area.
Admittedly, the Court did not hesitate to engage in such abstract judicial review in the
past (notably in cases such as Klass v. Germany, Dudgeon v. the UK, or S.A.S. v.
France) but those cases were rather exceptional and the lack of a clear interference
with the applicants’ bodily integrity could have put the applicants on thin ice.
No distinction between contagious and non-contagious diseases
In my opinion, the Court’s failure to distinguish between contagious and non-
contagious diseases remains the principal deficiency of the judgment. Clearly, the
state-imposed duty of vaccination protects two different legitimate aims: the health of
the vaccinated child on the one hand (in relation to all diseases) and public health
on the other hand (in relation to contagious diseases only). While the Court seems to
have realised this dichotomy at the opening stage of its argumentation (272), it failed
to maintain this distinction throughout its judgment. Briefly put, in the case of tetanus,
a non-vaccinated child is the only one in danger, while in the case of measles, the
danger pertains both to the non-vaccinated child and to everyone with whom the child
has interacted, especially to those who have not been immunised against the disease.
The Court makes a very unpersuasive claim in 288: it opens the argument with
reference to contagious diseases and herd immunity, but then makes a general claim
encompassing also situations where ‘herd immunity is not relevant due to the nature of
the disease (e.g. tetanus)’, without any attempt to explain the difference between the
two. (In his dissenting opinion, Judge Wojtyczek points to the lack of ‘any logical link
between the first and the second sentence’ in this paragraph and calls the argument ‘a
non sequitur’; 15.) Similarly, when assessing the effectiveness of the vaccination, the
Court refers to serious outbreaks which ‘may cause disruption to society’ (300) without
admitting that this only applies to some of the diseases included in vaccination duty.
Suitability of the measures to achieve the legitimate aim?
I may be opening Pandora’s box here… but are the measures even suitable to achieve
the (twofold) legitimate aim articulated by the Court in 272? If a child’s parents steadily
oppose the vaccination duty, burying them in fines will not protect their child’s health.
Similarly, the exclusion of a non-vaccinated child from pre-school education will not
prevent all interactions of such child with its peers, given that it can still play on
public playgrounds or participate in various free time activities where children interact.
Moreover, exclusion from kindergarten is merely a temporary measure, given that one
year later that child must enrol in obligatory primary education, thus coming into contact
with peers and potentially endangering some of them. Obviously, both the fines and the
exclusion from pre-school education probably play a deterrent role for many parents
who may decide to comply with the duty under the threat of those sanctions; yet, a
dutiful test of proportionality could pronounce the failure of a measure already at the
stage of its suitability to achieve the pursued aim.
Missed opportunity to offer a truly persuasive reasoning
I fully subscribe both to Judge Wojtyczek’s lament that the majority of the court
‘express[ed] strong value judgments without a sufficient factual basis’ as well as to
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his certitude that, nevertheless, ‘there are strong objective arguments in favour of
finding a non-violation of the Convention rights’ (dissenting opinion, 18). In other words,
there were far better arguments for a judgment finding no violation than the Court has
presented in the analysed judgment.
All in all, the state had a very strong position in the Vav#i#ka case. Unlike in cases
on sterilisation of women, police brutality, or lengthy judicial proceedings, this time the
government was not attempting to excuse grave mistakes or systemic mishaps; rather,
it defended a well-meant and reasonably well-functioning policy designed to protect
the lives and health of its inhabitants, i.e. matters which belong to the states’ positive
obligations under the Convention (282). However, I understand the dissenting judge’s
desire for a better reasoning in which the Court would show ‘that the benefits for society
as a whole and for its members outweigh the individual and social costs and justify
taking the risk of suffering the side-effects of a vaccination’ (dissenting opinion, 6).
Furthermore, the Court left many of the applicants’ arguments unaddressed. To give
but one example, the applicants claimed that while children must be vaccinated in order
to enrol in a kindergarten, this duty is not enforced on the kindergarten’s staff. The
Court contented itself with a formalist argument: ‘the staff members concerned should
normally have received all the prescribed vaccinations at the relevant time, as required
by law’ (308). Well, what if they have not received them, either because such vaccines
did not exist at the relevant time, or simply because the staff members did not grow
up in the Czech Republic? (See also Judge Wojtyczek’s dissenting opinion, 15.) The
Court’s judgment seems to forget that staff members, as well as children, can travel
from one state to another. In the absence of a European consensus on vaccination
plans and with the growing mobility of persons, the states need a more persuasive
solution for such situations.
Preaching to the choir?
In her dissenting opinion to the Czech Constitutional Court’s plenary case on
vaccination (Pl. ÚS 19/14), Judge Šimá#ková wrote: ‘In most western European
countries where human rights protection and respect for freedom and individual
autonomy is at the highest level…, there is no vaccination duty imposed by
law.’ Against this background, Judge Šimá#ková claimed that although the Czech
paternalist healthcare system was not ready for an immediate abolishment of the
vaccination duty, ‘it should be a perspective aim of a state that respects the freedom
of its citizens to carry out all medical interventions on the basis of a free and informed
consent and, as far as medical interventions on children, that such consent should be
essentially obtained from their parents…’
As a recipient of Czech healthcare services, I am quite used to the durable paternalist
arrangement. A couple of years ago, my physician informed me that the nurse would
give me a tetanus vaccine. When I dared to ask about the pros and cons, the doctor
reminded me sternly about the number of people sitting in the waiting room; if she had
to explain everything to everyone, her working day would be twice as long…
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 Everyone familiar with the Czech healthcare system will understand that the shift from
compulsory vaccination to a voluntary system is not imminent. Yet, if a state decides
to impose a certain treatment on its inhabitants, the least it should do is to offer a
strong and persuasive justification for such intervention in the persons’ bodily integrity.
Similarly, if the ECtHR is convinced that the Czech policy of compulsory vaccination
does not breach the rights guaranteed by the Convention, its argumentation should be
persuasive not only for those who believe in the importance of vaccines but primarily
for those who do not.
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